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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16534 
JACOB J. L&~ORIE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was tried and convicted of possession of 
a dangerous weapon while on parole for a felony, a second-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-503(2) 
(1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury in the Seventh 
Judicial District Court, in and for Grand County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, presiding. Appellant was 
found guilty on January 23, 1979, of the offense charged and 
was sentenced to serve 1 to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment of the lower court. 
STATEHENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 14, 1978, Jessee Powell, an off-duty 
trooper for the Utah Highway Patrol, stopped his truck 
at the scene of an automobile accident to assist anyone 
possibly injured (T. 17). Mr. Powell administered first 
aid to the appellant who had been a passenger in the vehicle 
that had crashed. Mr. Powell also prevented the appellant 
from leaving the scene in another passerby's car because 
of his belief that the appellant was intoxicated (T. 18). 
Shortly thereafter, Charles Durrant, a twelve-year 
old boy who was with Mr. Powell, observed that the appellant 
was holding what appeared to be a sawed-off shotgun (T. 36, 
43, 50). Mr. Powell never actually saw the appellant with 
the shotgun. However, he did see the appellant run down intc 
an old wash in a crunched over position. The appellant 
was joined in the wash by Hr. Lowery, the driver of the 
vehicle that had crashed (T. 20, 25). 
Trooper David Bailey of the Utah Highway Patrol 
arrived at the scene and went with ~r. Powell down into 
the wash where they were met by the appellant and Mr. 
Lowery (T. 20). The appellant had a metal scabbard in 
his hand (T. 52) 
-~-
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under the influence of alcohol and the appellant was 
arrested for public intoxication. Both were transported 
by Trooper Bailey to Green River, Utah (T. 52, 53). 
After the arrest, Mr. Powell and the two boys 
who were with him, searched the wash and found the sword to 
the scabbard, a sawed-off shotgun and a shotgun shell (T. 22). 
The appellant denied owning the gun and claimed to 
have never seen it before (T. 60). The appellant was charged 
with possession of a dangerous weapon while on parole for a 
felony. On January 23, 1979, the appellant was tried by a 
jury in the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand 
County. To prove that the appellant was on parole for a 
felony, the State relied upon the testimony of Joseph L. 
Waters, a parole agent from Colorado and State's exhibit one: 
the Parole Agreement and the Judgment and Conviction Sentence 
and Mittimus of the appellant. The trial court ruled, over 
the objection of the defense attorney, that this evidence 
was not hearsay (T. 8, 14). The state did not prove that 
the sawed-off shotgun in the possession of the appellant was 
capable of operation. The appellant was convicted of 
possession of a dangerous weapon while on parole for a felony 
and sentenced to serve 1 to 15 years at the Utah State 
~rison. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY 
ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE OFFERED 
BY THE STATE TO PROVE THAT THE 
APPELLANT VIAS ON PAROLE AFTER BEING 
CONVICTED OF A FELONY. 
The appellant contends that the testimony of Mr. 
Waters, a Colorado parole agent, and State's Exhibit 1, 
the appellant's parole agreements and Judgement of Conviction 
Sentence and Mittimus, were improperly admitted into 
evidence at trial because of Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, "Hearsay Evidence Excluded, -Exceptions." The 
appellant attempts to interpret the possible exceptions to 
the hearsay rule to make them inapplicable to the present 
case. Subsection 13 of Rule 63 reads as follows: 
(13). Business Entries and the Like. 
Writings offered as memoranda or records 
of acts, conditions or events to prove 
the facts stated therein, if the judge 
finds that they were made in the regular 
course of a business at or about the time 
of the act, condition or event recorded, 
and that the sources of information from 
which made and the method and circumstances 
of their preparation were such as to 
indicate their trustworthiness; 
The appellant contends that this exception does not permit 
State's Exhibit 1 to be entered as evidence because it 
was prepared by a deputy clerk of the Second Judicial Court 
of Colorado, and not by an emoloyee of the Colorado Division 
-4-
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of Parole (see appellant's brief page 8-9). Such an 
interpretation is too narrow because it ignores the spirit 
of the hearsay exceptions and the case law regarding the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence. The correct intent of 
subsection 13 of Rule 63 is to allow the trial judge to 
admit the record if he is satisfied that the preparation and 
keeping of the records is, "such as to indicate their 
trustworthiness." In the present case, this criteria was 
met and the judge determined that the evidence was trustworthy. 
All four documents contained in state's exhibit 1 were 
properly notarized as true and correct copies (T. 8-15). 
Furthermore, the trial judge questioned Hr. Waters as follows: 
THE COURT: Mr. Waters, these documents 
are kept--of which these are certified 
copies, are kept in the usual course of 
your duties? They're within your office; 
are they? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. They're kept 
under lock and key. 
THE COURT: These are actual copies 
of the documents that you have there and 
that you use in the course of your super-
vision of the various people that come 
under your control; is that correct? 
THE ~ITNESS. Yes. That's correct. 
I!R. BENCE: I'll renew my request, 
you Honor. May Exhibit 1 be received? 
THE COURT: Yes. Exhibit 1 will be 
received in evidence. 
MR. MORTENSEK: I have to object 
to that stre:-Juousl\·, vour Honor. 
-5-
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(T. 14). 
THE COURT: You have objected. I'm 
overruling it. It clearly comes under an 
exception to the Hearsay Rule that it's 
kept in the usual course of business and 
under supervision. The testimony was it 
was under his supervision and control and 
had been for a number of years and the Court 
has the right to let him know why he had it 
under his supervision, and that these are 
the documents out of his file and that 
justifies that situation. 
The trial judge was satisfied that the records 
in State's Exhibit 1 were genuine records kept in the regular 
course of business and that they were trustworthy and thus 
he properly received them into evidence. 
Case law substantiates the proposition that the 
criteria of trustworthiness is at the heart of the hearsay 
exceptions. The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Sibert, 310 
P.2d 388, 6 Utah 2d 198 (Utah, 1957), said in reference to 
hearsay, "Such testimony is not admissible on the grounds 
that it lacks trustworthiness." (310 P.2d at 390). In 
United States v. Holland, 378 F. Supp 144 (1974), the Court 
said, "We believe that the focus of the hearsay rule and its 
exceptions is the trustworthiness, the reliability of the 
out of court declaration." (378 F. Supp. at 158). See also: 
Oltman v. Hiller, 407 F.2d 376 (7th Circuit, 1969); Pope 
v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 17 (D.C. Cal. 1968); Sabation \'. 
Curtiss National Bank of ~liami Springs, 415 F.2d 632 (C.A. Fla. 
1969). 
-6-
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Respondent submits that because the emphasis 
of the hearsay exceptions goes to the reliability of the 
testimony or record, the appellant's overly narrow con-
struction of subsection 13 of Rule 65 has no merit. The 
trial judge determined that Mr. Waters' testimony and 
State's Exhibit 1 were reliable, and he therefore acted 
properly in allowing this evidence to come into court. 
B. 
THE TRIAL COURT IS ACCORDED A LARGE 
MEASURE OF DISCRETION IN DETERMINING 
MATTERS OF EVIDENCE AND SHOULD ONLY 
BE REVERSED IF THIS DISCRETION IS 
ABUSED. 
It is a well-established rule that the trial court 
has wide discretion in allowing evidence to be received into 
court and unless there is a clear abuse of discretion, the 
appellate court will not overrule the trial court's decision. 
In reference to alleged hearsay records of evidence, the 
Washington Supreme Court said, "In this State, the ruling of 
the trial judge in admitting or excluding such records is 
given much weight and will not be reversed unless there 
has ~een a manifest abuse of discretion. Cantrill v. American 
Mail Line, 257 P.2d 179, 42 \'lash. 2d 590 (Wash. 1953)." This 
rule is followed in most all appellate courts. See: Short 
v. Da1ms, 537 P.2d 754, 36 Colo. App. 109 (Colo. 1975); 
State v. Cooper, 504 P.2d 978, 161 Hont. 85, (Mont. 1972); 
Butler-\'. l'iong, 573 P.2d 86, 117 Ariz. 395 (Ariz. 1977). 
-7-
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that it will not 
overrule the trial court unless there is a clear abuse 
of discretion in cases involving: evidence in general, 
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah, 1976), evidence of an 
expert witness, Lamb v. Bangert, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah, 1974), 
the materiality of evidence, Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
565 P.2d 1139 (Utah, 1977), and many others. See West's 
Pacific Digest 3, Appeal and Error XIV(f). 
The rule that the appellate court will not overrule 
the judgment of the trial court absent abuse of discretion 
applies to the present case. As mentioned, the trial judge 
examined the witness himself to determine the reliability 
of the evidentiary records, State's Exhibit 1. The judge 
was satisfied that they were reliable and there is no 
indication of any abuse of discretion. The respondent urges 
this Court to uphold the decision of the trial court. 
POINT II. 
A. 
THE STATE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PROVE 
THAT THE S!-!OTGU!'J \~AS OPERABLE IN 
ORDER FOR IT TO BE A DANGEROUS 
vJL".PON. 
The appellant was convicted of possession a 
dangerous weapon while on parole for a felony under § 76-10-SOl; 
Utah Code Ann. , ( 19 53) , as amended. However, the state 
neverproved that the sawed-off shotgun in the appellant's 
possession was capable of opera~ion. ~he appella~t contends 
-8-
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that absent this proof, he was not in possession of a 
dangerous weapon and therefore should not have been convicted. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Nielson, 554 P.2d 489 
(Utah, 1975); held that a gun was a dangerous weapon whether 
it was loaded or unloaded. The respondent argues that for 
there to be any merit to the appellant's argument on this 
point, the court would apparently need to reverse its 
decision in Nielson and hold that for a gun to be a dangerous 
weapon it would need to be loaded and otherwise capable of 
operation. The appellant is seeking a reversal of Nielson. 
(Appellant's brief, page 15). 
The respondent urges this Court to uphold its 
decision in Nielson and rule that the sawed-off shotgun in 
the appellant's possession was a dangerous weapon, whether 
the state proved it was capable of operation or not. It 
is the position of the majority of jurisdictions that have 
addressed the issue that a firearm is a dangerous weapon 
whether loaded or unloaded. See Reed v. State, 199 So.2d 
803 (Hiss. 1967); People v. Law, 39 A.D. 2d 904, 334 N.Y.S. 
2d 398 (1972); State v. Dorsey, 491 S.W. 2d 301 (Mo. 1973); 
United States v. \~are, 315 F. Supp. 1333 (1970). The law 
stating that a 9un is a dangerous weapon whether loaded or 
not is based on sound reasoning. In State v. Quail, 5 Boyce 
310, '?2 A. 859 (Del. 1914), the Court said: 
-9-
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We think it quite immaterial whether 
the revolver be loaded or not, because 
such an instrument is commonly regarded 
as a deadly weapon without regard to its 
condition. If the absence of bullts 
would make the weapon a harmless one, 
then any condition that would prevent 
its being used at the time injuriously, 
would have a like effect. For example, 
the ~ain spring might be out of order, 
and according to the defendant's con-
tention this would make the instrument 
not deadly within the meaning of the 
statute. 
If we should sustain the contention 
of the defendant we fear that many 
persons would carry a pistol unloaded 
but at the same time have bullets secreted 
upon their person to be used if desired. 
As we have said the law was intended 
to discourage and prevent so far as 
possible, the carrying of weapons that 
are commonly and rightfully regarded as 
deadly. We think that a revolver, even 
though unloaded or in such a defective 
condition that it could not be fired, 
cannot be lawfully carried in this state 
concealed upon the person. The motion 
of the defendant is refused. 
In relationship to § 76-10-503 (2), Utah Code Ann., (1953), 
as amended, "Possession of a dangerous weapon while on 
parole for a felony," whether a sawed-off shotgun is capable 
of operation is not the main concern. The real issue is that 
a person possessing a sawed-off shotgun, operable or not, 
has power over others through the threat of death of serious 
bodily injury. This Court said in Nielson, "\Je believe 
-10-
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the statute's purpose was to deter those convicted of 
violent crimes from thereafter having guns, loaded or not." 
In People v. Halley, 268 N.E. 2d 449, the Illinois 
appellate court said: 
l~e think it clear, however, that 
it was not a necessary part of the 
state's case to prove that the pistols 
were loaded with bullets, contained a 
firing pin, had open barrels or were 
otherwise in an operable condition. It 
is established that it is unnecessary 
to prove that a gun is a deadly weapon. 
People v. Nerritt, 367 Ill., 521, 12 
N.E.2d 7; People v. Dwyer, 324 Ill. 363, 
155 N.E. 216. 
The ruling in Halley applies directly to this case. The 
trial court did not need to prove that the shotgun was 
operable and therefore dangerous, because the Utah Supreme 
Court had already held that a gun is a dangerous weapon, 
whether loaded or not. 
B. 
BECAUSE THE STATE HAS NOT REQUIRED 
TO PROVE THAT THE SHOTGUN I~AS A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON, THE APPELLANT'S 
CONVICTION OF A SECOND DEGREE FELONY 
\·JAS CORRECT. 
Because of the reasoning in Point II A. above, 
the appellant was properly convicted of "possession of a 
dangerous weapon while on parole for a felony," under 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-503 (2) (1953), as amended, a second-
degree :'elony. Utah Code l'nn., § 76-3-203 (2) (1953), as 
-11-
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amended, sets forth the term of imprisonment for a second-
degree felony as follows: 
Felony conviction--Indeterminate 
term of imprisonment--Increase of 
sentence if firearrro used--A person who 
has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an in-
determinate term as follows: 
(2) In the case of a felony of 
the second degree, for a term at not less 
than one year nor more than 15 years but 
if the trier of fact finds a firearm or 
a facsimile or the representation of 
a firearm was used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony, the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted 
for a term of one year to run consecutively 
and not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted 
for an indeterminate term not to exceed 
five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; 
The appellant was sentenced to 1 to 15 years at the Utah 
State Prison in accordance with Utah Code Ann., § 76-3-203(2) 
(1953), as amended, and there was no error in imposing this 
sentence. This sentence should be upheld. 
POINT III. 
IF THE TRIAL COURT DID COMMIT ERR, 
THE PROPER RE~lliDY SHOULD BE A RE-
TRIAL. 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-1-501 (1953) as amended, provides: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal 
proceeding is presumed to be innocent 
until each element of the offense charged 
against him is provec1 beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In absence of such proof, the 
defendant shall be acquitted. 
Emphasis added. 
-12-
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The a?pellant contends that on the basis of this statute and 
Points I and II of his brief, the appellant should be 
acquitted. The respondent argues that even if this Court 
should find that the trial court erred, despite the arguments 
of Point I and II herein, the proper remedy is not acquittal, 
but a new trial. Respondent submits that the appellant again 
places too narrow of an interpretation upon the statute in 
question. Utah Code Ann., § 76-l-501 (1953), as amended, states, 
"In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted." 
In the present case, even if the trial court did err by allowing 
the alleged hearsay evidence, (Point I), to be entered into 
court, this issue can be remanded and proven by the very 
evidence the appellant alleged would have been proper at 
trial. There was no absence of proof at the trial court, 
but merely the use of proof to which the appellant objected. 
In State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 
(Utah, 1951), the Utah Supreme Court said when speaking about 
the value of stolen property in a larceny case: 
The major portion of the Attorney 
General's brief deals with the con-
tention that if the failure to prove 
value recuires a reversal of the case, the 
defendant is not entitled to go free, 
but only to a new trial. With this we 
agree. -It is well settled that reversal 
of a conviction at the instance of the 
defendant, and subsequent remand of the 
case for new trial does not constitute 
the defendant twice in jeopardy to entitle 
-13-
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him to go free. 15 Am. Jur. 89, 
Crim. Law, Sec. 427; People v. 
Travers, 77 Cal. 176, 19 P. 268; People 
v. Eppinger, 109 Cal. 294, 41 P. 1037; 
People v. Stratton, 136 Cal.App. 201, 
28 P.2d 695. And see Sec. 105-39-2, 
U.C.A. 1943, and State v. Kessler, 15 
Utah 142, 49 P. 293. 
Appellant submits that this case is supplanted by Utah Code 
Ann., § 76-1-501 (1953), as amended, and thus the appellant 
should be acquitted. Respondent submits that appellant badly 
misconstrues both the statute and the ruling of Lawrence. The 
Lawrence case held that the remand of a case did not violate 
the constitutional guarantee of protection against double 
jeopardy. This issue is completely distinguishable from the 
absence of proof issue in Utah Code Ann., § 76-1-501 (1953), 
as amended. State v. Lawrence, was reaffirmed in 1971 by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Jaramillo, 481 P.2d 394 (Utah, 
1971), and is in accordance with the United States Supreme Court 
cases of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 u.s. 711, 89 S.Ct. 
2072, 2089, 23 L.Ed. 2d 656 (1969), and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 
412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed. 2d 714 (1973). 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-42-3 and 77-42-4 (1953), as 
amended, nake it clear that the Supreme Court has the power 
to order a nevl trial if it deems necessary. Utah Code Ann., 
§ 77-1-501 (1953), as amended does not bind the Supreme Court 
-l4-
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into acquitting the appellant because in this case there is 
sufficient evidence. Therefore, if this Court finds that 
there was error at the trial, the case should be remanded for 
retrial, but the appellant should not be acquitted. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments raised by appellant in seeking to 
have his conviction for the offense of possession of a 
dangerous weapon while on parole for a felony, Utah Code 
Ann., § 76-10-503 (2) (1953), as amended, are without merit. 
The trial court found that the evidence relied 
upon to establish that the appellant was on parole for 
a felony was reliable and fell within the hearsay exceptions. 
The jury convicted the appellant of being in the possession 
of a dangerous weapon, i.e.: a sawed-off shotgun, and it 
was unnecessary for the State to prove that this sawed-off 
shotgun was capable of operation, loaded or not. Based upon 
the foregoing points and authorities, appellant's conviction 
was proper and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOiv 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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